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The Second Way 
RICHARD L. CARTWRIGHT 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
My title refers to the second of the arguments for the existence of God 
commonly called Aquinas's "Five Ways." The argument reads as follows: 
The second way is from the notion of efficient cause. We find among 
observable things an order of efficient causes. We do not find, nor is it 
possible, that something is an efficient cause of itself; for such a thing 
would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now it is not possible to 
proceed to infinity in efficient causes. The reason is that in all ordered 
efficient causes, the first is the cause of the intermediate, and the 
intermediate is the cause of the last, whether the intermediates are 
many or only one. But remove the cause, and the effect is removed; 
therefore, if there is no first in efficient causes, neither will there be a 
last nor an intermediate. But if there is a procession to infinity in 
efficient causes, there will be no first efficient cause. And thus there will 
be no last effect and no intermediate causes, which is obviously false. 
Therefore it is necessary to posit some first efficient cause, which all 
call God. (ST I, 2, 3)l 
1. Here and elsewhere ST = Summa Theologiae, Leonine text, as contained in 
Sancti Thomae de Aquino: Summa Theologiae (Roma: Editiones Paulinae, 1962): 
"Secunda via est ex ratione causae efficientis. Invenimus enim in istis sensibilibus 
esse ordinem causarum efficientium: nec tamen invenitur, nec est possibile, quod 
aliquid sit causa efficiens sui ipsius; quia sic esset prius seipso, quod est impossibile. 
Non autem est possibile quod in causis efficientibus procedatur in infinitum. Quia 
in omnibus causis efficientibus ordinatis, primum est causa medii, et medium est 
causa ultimi, sive media sint plura sive unum tantum: remota autem causa, re- 
movetur effectus: ergo, si non fuerit primum in causis efficientibus, non erit ul- 
timum nec medium. Sed si procedatur in infinitum in causis efficientibus, non erit 
prima causa eff~ciens: et sic non erit nec effectus ultimus, nec causae efficientes 
mediae: quod patet esse falsum. Ergo est necesse ponere aliquam causam efficien- 
tem primam: quam omnes Deum nominant." 
- 
For translations I have relied on St. Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologica, 3 vols., 
trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger, 1947), and 
especially on Anton C. Pegis, Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas (New York: 
Random House, 1945), but I have not followed either faithfully. 
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THE CONCLUSION
The conclusion is that there exists "some first efficient cause" {aliquant
causam efficientem pήmam). Now, anything that is a first efficient cause surely
is an efficient cause that has no efficient cause. So the conclusion of the
Second Way must at any rate imply
(1) Ex(EyxCy&~EyyCx),
where C is the relation of efficient causation, that is, the relation x bears to
yjust in case x is an efficient cause of y.
It may be thought that we are to understand the conclusion to be a
stronger proposition, namely,
(2) E2x (EyxCy & -EyyCx)
which requires that there be exactly one thing in the field of C to which
nothing bears the relation C. That (2) is the conclusion may be thought to
be implied by Aquinas's use of 'first' {pήmam) and, as well, by the relative
clause 'which all call God' {quam omnesDeum nominant). Now, it is no doubt
true that Aquinas was ready to affirm (2); nevertheless, I doubt that he took
it to be demonstrated in the Second Way. Indeed, I think the project in ST
I, 2, 3 is to demonstrate that there is a God. Not until ST I, 11, 3 does
Aquinas address the question whether there is one God {utrum Deus sit
unus) and there he relies for a positive answer mainly on the simplicity and
perfection of the divine nature, which he considers himself to have demon-
strated in the intervening articles.2
To understand ST I, 2, 3 in this way requires that there the word 'God'
be understood as a general term; otherwise 'there is a (at least one) God'
would be nonsense. But this is hardly an impediment. As Peter Geach has
more than once pointed out,3 Aquinas himself said that the word Deus is a
nomen naturae: "this name 'God' is an appellative name, not a proper name,
because it signifies the divine nature as in a possessor" (ST I, 13, 9, ad 2).4
In Aquinas's usage, then, the word 'God' admits a plural. And indeed we
2. Medieval philosophers standardly separate the questions of whether there is
a God and whether there is one God. Henry of Ghent is explicit on the point:
"Whether there be one or several such is not the issue here in the question about
the being of God, but is a point that remains to be proved later in the question,
namely, about his unicity." Summa Quaestionem Ordinaήum 22, 4; as translated in
John F. Wippel and Allan B. Wolter, Medieval Philosophy (New York: Free Press,
1969), p. 382. Compare Duns Scotus, De Pήmo Pήncipio, III.
3. See Peter Geach, God and the Soul (New York: Schocken Books, 1969), p. 57,
and G. E. M. Anscombe and P. T. Geach, Three Philosophers (Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
sity, Press, 1961), p. 109.
4. "Hoc nomen Deus est nomen appellativum, et non proprium, quia significat
naturam divinam ut in habente." See also ST III, 35, 4, ad 3.
THE SECOND WAY 191
find him concluding at ST I, 11, 3 that "it is impossible that there be many
Gods" (impossibile est ergo esseplures Deos). Out of piety, I suppose, the author
of a certain Latin grammar cautions students to "decline Deus only in the
singular." Aquinas would have thought the piety misplaced.
As for the word 'first', notice that it is qualified by 'some' (aliquam);
and 'some first cause' must surely be interpreted in the sense of 'a cause to
which nothing is causally prior'.
According to Aquinas, God is an efficient cause of all things (other
than Himself, of course).5 An alternative strengthening of (1) may there-
fore be suggested, namely;
(3) Ex(EyxCy & -EyyCx & (z) (~z = x -> xCz)).
Again, I do not deny that we have here a proposition Aquinas would have
affirmed. But I think it is not the conclusion of the Second Way. For one
thing, no hint of it occurs in the text of the Second Way itself. For another,
not until I, 44, 1 does Aquinas attempt to show that " anything which in any
way exists is from God" (omne quod quocumque modo est, a Deo esse); and
though the argument is not easy to understand, it explicitly appeals to the
doctrine that God is per se subsistent being itself (ipsum esse per se subsistens),
which is allegedly demonstrated at I, 3, 4, and thus after the statement of
the Second Way.
Propositions (2) and (3) are, of course, interesting in themselves, but
a proper consideration of them would go well beyond the limits of this
article. My present point is simply that neither proposition is the conclusion
of the Second Way.
THE PREMISES
Aquinas takes his conclusion to follow from three propositions: first, that in
observable things there is an order of efficient causes {in istis sensibilibus esse
ordinem causarum efficientium) second, that it is not possible for something
to be an efficient cause of itself {nee tamen invenitur, nee est possibile, quod
aliquid sit causa efficiens sui ipsius) third, that it is not possible to proceed to
infinity in efficient causes {non autem est possibile quod in causis efficientibus
procedatur in infinitum). Subsidiary arguments are given for the second and
5. Thus he says at I, 44, 4, ad 4, "Deus sit causa efficiens . . . omnium rerum."
Translators—for instance, the English Dominicans and Pegis—use the definite
article where I have the indefinite. If their definite article is to be understood
strictly, then the question is how best to understand Aquinas. It becomes clear that
he could not have intended here to deny that, for example, Abraham was an
efficient cause of Isaac.
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third propositions; but as far as the Second Way is concerned, they do no
work unless the conclusion follows from the three propositions just men-
tioned.
The second proposition is clear enough. Without its modality, it says
that C is irreflexive:
(4) (x) ~ xCx.
But what of the first and third? Classroom expositions often take the third
to be, in contemporary jargon,
(5) There is no infinitely descending C-sequence,
that is, no sequence
such that Xj bears C to x ^ for each positive integer i. As for the first, these
same expositions take it to say no more than that C is nonempty:
(6) ExEyxCy.
Aquinas's reference, in the formulation of the first proposition and in
the subsidiary argument for the third, to an order of efficient causes may
raise a doubt about the accuracy of the classroom interpretation; and we
shall see later that such a doubt is indeed justified. But in the meantime
we may note that the resulting argument has at any rate one virtue: the
conclusion of the Second Way—that is, (1)—follows from the three propo-
sitions (4), (5), and (6); in fact, it follows simply from (5) and (6). Let
us see why.
VALIDITY OF THE ARGUMENT
A consequence of the axiom of choice (in the presence of other standard
set-theoretic axioms) is the pήnciple of dependent choices: If R is a nonempty
relation6 and the range of R is included in the domain of R, then there
exists an infinitely ascending R-sequence—that is, a sequence
x 0 ' x l> X2>
such that, for every natural number n, x
n
 bears R to x
n
 +
 v
 Assume the
axiom of choice in this form: every relation includes a function with the
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same domain.7 The principle of dependent choices is then demonstrable,
as follows. Let R be a nonempty relation of which the range is included in
the domain. By the axiom of choice, there is a function g included in R such
that the domain of g is the domain of R. Where x is any member of the
domain of R, there then exists by finite recursion a function f such that the
domain of f is the set of natural numbers, f(0) is x and f(n + 1) is g(f(n))
for every n. Since g is included in R, f(n) bears R to f(n 4- 1) for every n.
Hence, f is an infinitely ascending R-sequence, as required.8
The purpose of this little deduction is not to persuade anyone of the
truth of the principle of dependent choices. If persuasion is wanted, one
may better argue informally as follows. Again, let R be a nonempty relation
of which the range is included in the domain. Nonemptiness of R means
that something x bears R to something y. But then inclusion of the range of
R in the domain of R guarantees that y in turn bears R to something z,
which in its turn bears R to something w, and so on without end. If it is
pointed out that nothing in the situation requires that y, z, w, and so on be
other than x, one may simply agree; for, an infinitely ascending R-sequence,
as required by the principle of dependent choices, need not be nonrepeti-
tive.
Some easy manipulations show that the principle of dependent choices
can as well be put this way: if R is nonempty and the domain of R is included
in the range of R, then there is an infinitely descending R-sequence. Equiva-
lently, if R is nonempty and there is no infinitely descending R-sequence,
then the domain of R is not included in the range of R. Or, spelling out
what is meant by nonemptiness of R and noninclusion of its domain in its
range,
(7) For every relation R, if ExEyxRy and there is no infinitely
descending R-sequence, then Ex(EyxRy & ~EyyRx).
6.1 take relations always to be dyadic. I treat them as sets of ordered pairs, but
such outright identification is not essential to the discussion that follows.
7. A more familiar version is this: for every set X of nonempty sets, there is a
function f such that, for every A in X, f (A) is in A. Here f is called a choice function
for X. In particular, then, if R is a nonempty relation, there is a choice function g
for the set of sets of the form {z:xRz). But then the set of ordered pairs <x,y> such
that x belongs to the domain of R and y = g ({z:xRz}) is a function included in R
having the same domain as R. Thus the more familiar version implies that the one
in the text holds for nonempty relations; the case of the empty relation is trivial. For
the reverse implication, let X be a set of nonempty sets, and let E be the set of
ordered pairs <A,x> such that A is in X and x is in A. Then E includes a function
with the same domain, a function that is evidently a choice function for X.
8. The principle of dependent choices appears to have been first isolated by
Paul Bernays. See "A System of Axiomatic Set Theory," Journal of Symbolic Logic 7
(1942): 65-89, at 86. It is known to be weaker than the axiom choice: see A.
Mostowski, "On the Principle of Dependent Choices," Fundamenta Mathematicae 35
(1948): 127-30.
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Here we have the principle of dependent choices in a form immediately
relevant to the Second Way, for instantiation of (7) to the particular case of
C yields
(8) If ExEyxCy and there is no infinitely descending C-sequence
then Ex(EyxCy & -EyyCx),
which is the conditional having the conjunction of (5) and (6) as antece-
dent and (1) as consequent. If, as I think, (7) is a necessary truth, so is (8);
and if (8) is a necessary truth, (5) and (6) together strictly imply (1). Plain
truth of (7) permits us to say that the conjunction of (5) with (6) set
theoretically implies (1).
A SECOND SECOND WAY
By putting the principle of dependent choices to further work, we may
formulate an alternative version of the Second Way.
First, a couple of definitions. Where R is any relation and A any set, an
R-minimal member of A is a member of A to which nothing in A bears R;
and R is well founded if and only if every nonempty set has an R-minimal
member. Using the principle of dependent choices we may then show
(9) A relation R is well founded if and only if there is no infinitely
descending R-sequence.
Proof: It is obvious that a well-founded relation admits of no infinitely
descending sequence: the terms in any such sequence would constitute a
set that had no member minimal with respect to the relation. For the other
direction, assume that R is not well founded, so that some nonempty set A
has no R-minimal member. Let S be the restriction of R to A, that is, the
relation that x bears to y just in case x and y are members of A and x bears
R to y. Since A has no R-minimal member and S is included in R, the
domain of S is included in the range of S. So, by the principle of dependent
choices, there is an infinitely descending S-sequence. But any such is also
an infinitely descending R-sequence.
The upshot is that we obtain an equivalent of the classroom version of
the Second Way by replacing (5) with
(10) C is well founded.
The Second Way, thus understood, is simply this: since efficient causation
is nonempty and well founded, something is an efficient cause that has no
efficient cause.
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IRREFLEXIVITY AND TRANSITIVITY
We have seen that Aquinas seems to make the conclusion of the Second Way
depend on irreflexivity of the relation of efficient causation. Commentators
typically follow him on this point, and sometimes they take transitivity of the
relation to be an additional premise. Thus Anthony Kenny claims to detect
in each of the Five Ways a common formal structure: a nonempty relation
R is shown to be irreflexive and transitive, and from this it is concluded that
either the domain of R is not included in its range or there is an infinitely
descending R-sequence.9 Now, of course, it is true that if R is nonempty,
irreflexive, and transitive, then either the domain of R is not included in its
range or there is an infinitely descending R-sequence. That is an immediate
consequence of the principle of dependent choices. But I am nevertheless
dissatisfied with Kenny's description of the common formal structure, at
least in the case of the Second Way.
As for irreflexivity of C, it is enough to note that it adds nothing to the
deductive power of (5), or (10), and (6). The reason is that (4) is already a
consequence of (5): if x were to bear C to x, then {x} would have no
R-minimal member and hence C would not be well founded. More gener-
ally, (5) bans C-cycles, that is, sequences
X()> X l> •> x n
such that
xn Rx0 Rx2 R . . . Rxn _ !Rxn.
Again, the terms of such a sequence would constitute a set having no
R-minimal member.
For three reasons I have not assumed C to be transitive. One is that the
assumption is unnecessary: (1) follows without it. Another is that nothing
Aquinas says in the statement of the Second Way implies that efficient
causation is transitive. The third, and most important, is that Aquinas took
efficient causation to be nontransitive. Begetting is included in efficient
causation.10 But though Abraham begot Isaac and Isaac begot Jacob, Abra-
ham did not beget Jacob.
9. Anthony Kenny, The Five Ways: St. Thomas Aquinas' Proofs of God's Existence
(New York: Schocken Books, 1969), pp. 36-37. My description of the structure
differs from Kenny's in matters of detail that seem to me not to affect the points at
issue. In particular, I speak of an infinitely descending R-sequence, whereas Kenny
instead speaks of "an endless series of things standing in the relation R to each
other." His phrase admits of more than one interpretation; I have interpreted it
weakly.
10. See, for example, ST I, 46, 2, ad 7.
196 RICHARD L. CARTWRIGHT
PROBLEMS
When they first encounter the Second Way, students invariably question (5),
the proposition that there is no infinitely descending C-sequence. They do
not find the proposition obvious, and they find the argument Aquinas gives
for it question begging. Aquinas argued;
Now in efficient causes it is not possible to proceed to infinity,
because in all ordered efficient causes, the first is the cause of the
intermediate, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause,
whether the intermediates are many or only one. Now, remove the
cause and the effect is removed. Therefore, if there is no first cause
among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate,
cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to proceed to infinity, there
will be no first efficient cause, and thus neither will there be an ultimate
effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes—which is plainly false.11
It is indeed hard to overcome an impression that the question has been
begged.
Scholars may find it more troubling, however, that in other places
Aquinas explicitly states that infinitely descending C-sequences are possible.
Divine revelation alone assures us that in actuality there are none. But then
what is to be made of the argument just quoted, the conclusion of which
seems to be that infinitely descending C-sequences are not possible? And of
what use is an argument for the existence of God that rests on an article of
faith?
A text central to all this occurs in ST I, 46, 2. The question there under
discussion is whether it is a matter of faith that the world began. Aquinas
holds that it is. But he must answer objections, of which the seventh is a
purported demonstration that the world began:
If the world was eternal, generation was from eternity. Therefore one
man was begotten of another to infinity. But the father is an efficient
cause of the son, as is said in Physics II. Therefore in efficient causes
there is an infinite series—which is disproved in Metaphysics II.1 2
11. "Non autem est possibile quod in causis efficientibus procedatur in infini-
tum. Quia in omnibus causis efficientibus ordinatis, primum est causa medii, et
medium est causa ultimi, sive media sint plura sive unum tantum: remota autem
causa, removetur effectus: ergo, si non fuerit primum in causis efficientibus, non
erit ultimum nee medium. Sed si procedatur in infinitum in causis efficientibus,
non erit prima causa efficiens: et sic non erit nee effectus ultimus, nee causae
effϊcientes mediae: quod patet esse falsum."
12. "Si mundus fuit aeternus, et generatio fuit ab aeterno. Ergo unus homo
genitus est ab alio in infinitum. Sed pater est causa efficiens filii, ut dicitur in II Phys.
Ergo in causis efficientibus est procedere in infinitum: quod improbatur in II
Metaphys."
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Thus stated, the objection is silly: eternity of the world would hardly require
an endless generation of human beings.13 But Aquinas in effect responds
to a stronger version, which can be put this way:
If it is possible that the world did not begin, then it is possible that
there should have been an infinitely descending C-sequence. But, as is
shown in Metaphysics II, infinitely descending C-sequences are not pos-
sible. Therefore, it is not possible that the world did not begin.
Aquinas answers at some length:
In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity per se—if, for
instance, the causes per se required for some effect were multiplied to
infinity; for instance, if a stone is moved by a stick, the stick by the hand,
and so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity per
accidens in efficient causes; for instance, if all the causes multiplied to
infinity have the order of only one cause, but their multiplication is per
accidens: for example, as a craftsman acts by means of many hammers
per accidens, because one after another is broken. It is accidental, there-
fore, that one particular hammer should act after the action of another.
And it is likewise accidental to this man as generator that he is gener-
ated by another; for he generates as a man, and not as son of another
man. For all men generating hold one grade in the order of efficient
causes, namely the grade of a particular generator. Hence it is not
impossible that man is generated by man to infinity; but such a thing
would be impossible if the generation of this man depended upon this
man, and on an elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to
infinity.14
13. As Aquinas points out in De Aeternitate Mundi, where he remarks that "God
could have made the world without men and souls; or He could have made men at
the time He did make them, even though He had made all the rest of the world
from eternity"; as translated in Cyril Vollert et al., On the Eternity of the World
(Milwaukee, Wise: Marquette University Press, 1964), p. 25.
14. See also ST I—II, 1, 4.
In causis efficientibus impossibile est procedere in infinitum per se; ut puta si
causae quae per se requiruntur ad aliquem effectum, multiplicarentur in infinitum;
sicut si lapis moveretur a baculo, et baculus a manu, et hoc in infinitum. Sed per
accidens in infinitum procedere in causis agentibus non reputatur impossibile; ut
puta si omnes causae quae in infinitum multiplicantur, non teneant ordinem nisi
unius causae, sed earum multiplicatio sit per accidens; sicut artifex agit multis
martellis per accidens, quia unus post unum frangitur. Accidit ergo huic martello,
quod agat post actionem alterius martelli. Et similiter accidit huic homini, inquan-
tum generat, quod sit generatus ab alio: generat enim inquantum homo, et non
inquantum est filius alterius hominis; omnes enim homines generantes habent
gradum in causis efficientibus, scilicet gradum particularis generantis. Esset autem
impossibile, si generatio huius hominis dependeret ab hoc homine, et a corpore
elementari, et a sole, et sic in infinitum. See also ST I—II, 1, 4.
198 RICHARD L. CARTWRIGHT
The passage is not in every way transparent, so let me say what I can by way
of explanation.
The point of the illustration concerning the craftsman who uses infi-
nitely many hammers is not altogether clear. Let us imagine, with Geach, that
the craftsman is in particular "an immortal blacksmith who has been making
horseshoes from all eternity, and has naturally worn out no end of hammers
in the process"; and let us agree that "the making of the horseshoe now on
the anvil depends only upon the smith as efficient cause and the hammer
currently in use as instrument," so that "though no end of hammers have in
fact been broken in the past, they have nothing to do with the [present]
case."15 The difficulty is that we do not have an imagined case of an infinitely
descending C-sequence. I think Aquinas would have said that each hammer
is a cause, though one that acts through the action of the smith.16 And the
hammers do make up an imagined, infinitely descending temporal se-
quence. But such descending C-sequences as can be extracted from the
illustration are finite: none of the hammers bears C to any other, and no
horseshoe is described as the start of an infinitely descending C-sequence.
Maybe the illustration is to be understood somewhat differently: an
immortal smith again, but this time one who has been at work on a single
horseshoe from eternity and who has, in an extraordinary run of bad luck,
broken no end of hammers in the process. Here we imagine not only that
there have been infinitely many hammers used but also that the horseshoe
presently on the anvil has an infinite causal ancestry. Still no infinitely
descending C-sequence, however, for, again, none of the hammers can be
regarded as bearing C to any other.
Maybe, then, Aquinas has given us an overly succinct description of an
illustration that Averroes used and that may have been in the air. To explain
the kind of case in which "according to philosophical doctrine" an infinite
regress of efficient causes is possible, Averroes said that
when an artisan produces successively a series of products of craftsman-
ship with different instruments, and produces these instruments
through instruments and the latter again through other instruments,
the becoming of these instruments one from another is something
accidental, and none of these instruments is a condition for the exist-
ence of the product of craftsmanship except the first instrument which
is in immediate contact with the work produced . . . . And the instru-
ment with which this instrument is produced will be necessary for the
production of this instrument, but will not be necessary for the produc-
tion of the product of craftsmanship unless accidentally.17
15. Anscombe and Geach, Three Philosophers, p. 112.
16. See ST I, 36, 3.
17. Tahafut al-Tahafat, 4th discussion, as translated by Simon van den Bergh,
Averroes' Tahafut al-Tahafat (London: Luzac, 1954), vol. 1, p. 159. I say the illustra-
tion "may have been in the air" to avoid giving the impression that Aquinas might
have read Tahafut al-Tahafat. Apparently that work was not translated into Latin
until the fourteenth century.
THE SECOND WAY 199
Simplifying somewhat, we may this time imagine the immortal smith pro-
ducing the present horseshoe with a hammer he has produced with another
hammer, which latter hammer he has produced with still another, and so
on endlessly. And with that we do get an imaginary case of an infinitely
descending C-sequence.
Whatever in the end is to be made of Aquinas's first illustration, his
second appears to leave no doubt that he thought it possible for there to be
infinitely descending C-sequences: it is not impossible for man to be gener-
ated from man to infinity. But such a sequence would be ordered per
accidens, not per se. And we are expressly told that it is impossible for there
to be an infinitely descending C-sequence that is per se ordered. What is the
intended distinction? And how does it bear on the Second Way?
THE DISTINCTION
Aquinas is less explicit about the nature of the intended distinction than
one might have hoped. But certain of his remarks, together with some
things that Duns Scotus says, make it reasonably clear that a per se ordered
descending C-sequence is supposed to satisfy three conditions. First, the
restriction of C to the terms of the sequence is transitive, so that any term
of the sequence bears C to such terms as may follow it in the sequence. I
take it that this lies behind Aquinas's remark that "when we have many
ordered causes, it is necessary that, while the effect depends first and
principally on the first cause, it also depends in a secondary way on all the
intermediate causes" (ST I, 104, 2).1 8 And it is presumably what Scotus
meant when he said that "if anything is prior to the prior, it is prior to the
posterior."19 Second, the causal action of any term in the sequence is
simultaneous with that of any other term in the sequence, so that there is
some one time at which all the terms of the sequence exist. As Scotus says,
"All the causes per se ordered are necessarily required simultaneously for
that which is caused."20 Third, any "intermediate"—that is, any term y of the
sequence for which there are terms x and z in the sequence such that xCy
and yCz—exercises its causality by virtue of being caused by its immediate
predecessor in the sequence. This last condition is hard to state clearly, but
perhaps the idea is sufficiently conveyed by Aquinas's example: the hand
moves the stick and thereby the stick moves the stone. Aquinas puts the point
elsewhere by saying that "if there are many agents in order, the second
agent [i.e., any intermediate] always acts in virtue of the first; for the first
18. "Cum enim sunt multae causae ordinatae, necesse est quod effectus depen-
deat primo quidem et principaliter a causa prima; secundario vero ab omnibus
causis mediis." See also In octo libros Physicorum expositio, VIII, 9 (1047).
19. De Pήmo Pήncipio, II, argument for the second conclusion.
20. De Pήmo Pήncipio, III, argument to the second conclusion.
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agent moves the second to act" (ST I, 105, 5). 2 1 And Scotus says that "in per
se [ordered causes], the second, in so far as it causes, depends on the first."22
Though hard to state, the third condition is evidently to be regarded
as fundamental. Scotus says that transitivity follows from it, and Aquinas
reports Aristotle, apparently with approval, to the same effect:
Let A be something which is moved in respect to place by something
B. And B is moved by C; C is moved by D . . . . It is clear that when a
thing moves because it is moved, the mover and the mobile object are
moved simultaneously. For example, if the hand by its own motion
moves a staff, the hand and the staff are moved simultaneously. Hence
B is moved simultaneously when A is moved; and for the same reason
when B is moved, C is moved simultaneously; and when C is moved, D
is moved simultaneously. Therefore the motions of A and of all the
others are simultaneous and in the same time.23
I conjecture that neither Aquinas nor Scotus ever played with dominoes.
The finger by moving moves the first domino, which by moving moves the
second, and so on down the line; but even with a not very long line, the
motion of the finger visibly stops before the last domino falls.
It is clear in any case that a descending C-sequence in which x
n
 begets
x
n
 _ i satisfies none of these conditions, in particular, not the third: it is not
by virtue of Abraham's act of begetting that Isaac begets Jacob.
A THIRD SECOND WAY?
Aquinas's subsidiary argument for the impossibility of an infinitely descend-
ing sequence of efficient causes must thus be understood as directed only
to those cases in which the sequence is per se ordered. A number of
commentators on the Second Way have pointed this out.2 4 Some appear to
21. "Si sint multa agentia ordinata, semper secundum agens agit in virtute
primi: nam primum agens movet secundum ad agendum."
22. De Pήmo Pήncipio, III, argument to the second conclusion. In the same place
Scotus states a fourth condition, namely, that "in perse ordered [causes] the causality
is of another nature and order, because the higher is more perfect."
23. In octo libros Physicorum, VII, 2 (892); as translated by Richard J. Blackwell,
Richard J. Spath, and W. Edmund Thirlkel, Commentary on Aήstotle's Physics by St.
Thomas Aquinas (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1963), p. 426.
24. See, for example, Patterson Brown, "Infinite Causal Regression," Philosophi-
cal Review 75 (1966): 510-25; reprinted in Anthony Kenny, Aquinas: A Collection of
Cήtical Essays (Garden City; New York: Doubleday, 1969) pp. 214-36; Reginald
Garrigou-Lagrange, Reality: A Synthesis ofThomistic Thought (St. Louis and London:
Herder, 1950), pp. 73-74; Etienne Gilson, The Chήstian Philosophy of St. Thomas
Aquinas, (New York: Random House, 1966), pp. 67-68; Kenny, The Five Ways, pp.
41-42; Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 1983), pp. 230-31; Michael Dummett, The Seas of Language (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1993), pp. 366-67.
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think that recognition of the distinction somehow removes any problems
the Second Way may have seemed to present.25 Others are less complacent,
speculating as to the reasons Aquinas and others may have had for denying
the possibility of infinite descent in the per se case.26 Some conclude that
there are no good reasons.27
Little attention has been given, however, to the job of reconstructing
the Second Way in the light of the distinction between per se and per
accidens ordered descending C-sequences. Once the possibility of infinitely
descending C-sequences is acknowledged, how is the argument supposed to
go? It will not do simply to replace (5) with
(11) There is no infinitely descending per se ordered descending
C-sequence.
For then (1) no longer follows: after all, (11) is compatible with there being
no per se ordered descending C-sequences. If in addition (6) is replaced by
(12) There is some per se ordered descending C-sequence,
it will follow that in some per se ordered descending C-sequence there is a
term preceded by nothing in the sequence. But that follows from (12)
alone; in any case, (1) still doesn't follow.
If we are to preserve the structure of the classroom version of the
Second Way, and I think we ought to try, what is wanted is a (nonempty)
species of efficient causation—that is, a relation B such that
(13) ExEyxBy
and
(14) (x) (y)(xBy^xCy),
which relation is also such that
(15) Every descending B-sequence is per se ordered
and
(16) (x) [ (EyxBy & -EyyBx) -> -EyyCx].
From (11) and (15) there will follow
(17) There is no infinitely descending B-sequence.
And from (13) and (17), for reasons now familiar, there will follow
(18) Ex (EyxBy &-EyyBx);
25. For example, Gilson, Christian Philosophy.
26. See Brown, "Infinite Causal Regression," and Kenny, The Five Ways.
27. See Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum.
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that is, there exists a B-first. And then by (16) there will exist a C-first. But
what can serve as B?
Aquinas follows Aristotle in distinguishing two kinds of efficient causa-
tion. Of one kind are cases in which something changes something: the
physician heals the patient; the batter swings the bat; the fire heats the
water. Of another kind are cases of generation, in which something causes
something to come to be. Among cases of this kind are acts of divine
creation and of natural generation, such as begetting and building.28 It is
commonly held that in the Second Way, Aquinas has his eye especially on
the second kind of case, the other having been central in the First Way.
Thus Geach says, "The first two 'ways' differ only in that one relates to
processes of change and the other to things' coming to be; the further
argument is quite parallel in each case."29 I am inclined to think, however,
that the efficient causation of the Second Way is neither of these but rather
what Aquinas elsewhere calls conservation.^
At ST I, 104, 1, Aquinas addresses the question of whether creatures
need to be kept in being by God (utrum creaturae indigeant utaΏeo conserven-
tur). Of course, he thinks they do, and in fact he had already said so at ST
I, 9, 2. What is of interest for present purposes, however, is that here, in the
course of explaining his answer, he draws a distinction between two sorts of
causal agency. It must be recognized, he says, that "an agent may be the
cause of the becoming of its effect and yet not of its being" (aίiquod agens est
causa sui effectus secundum fieri, et non directe secundum esse eius). The builder
causes the house to come into being, and the begetter causes the begotten
to come into being, but neither the builder nor the begetter causes the
being of that which is thus caused to become. Dark words, no doubt; yet the
idea seems not altogether inaccessible.
Aquinas would distinguish between two questions: (1) what causal
agent is responsible for the coming into existence of the house or the child?
(2) What causal agent is responsible for the continued existence of the
house or child? Evidently an answer to the first need not be an answer to
the second: the builder's work typically ends with the completion of the
house, and the begetter preserves the begotten, if at all, only, as Aquinas
says, "indirectly," that is, by removing causes of "corruption"—say by guard-
ing the child from falling into the fire {puta si aliquis puerum custodial ne
cadat in ignem). Aquinas puts the distinction by saying that a cause of
becoming is the reason "that this matter acquires this form" {quod haec
mateήa acquirat hanc formam), whereas a cause of being is a "cause of the
form as such" {causa formae secundum rationem talis formae). It is simpler and
28. For the distinction between the two kinds of efficient causation, and also
for other distinctions within that genus of causation, see Aquinas's In duodecim libros
Metaphysicorum expositio, V, 1. 2.
29. Anscombe and Geach, Three Philosophers, p. 113. See also Gilson, Chήstian
Philosophy, p. 66, and Kenny, The Five Ways, p. 36.
30. Suggested also, if I understand him correctly, by Reginald Garrigou-La-
grange in Reality, pp. 72-75.
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perhaps clearer to say, with Ockham, that what produces need not be that
which conserves.31
I do not mean to suggest that we are now out of the woods. On the
contrary, the conclusion of the Second Way is now to be seen as resting on
five premises: (11), (13), (14), (15), and (16), with B understood to be the
relation of conservation; and I suppose any one of these propositions might
be questioned.
My inclination is to concede (14) and (15), if only because I hardly
know what to say for or against them. 3 2 As for (13) and (16), I suspect that
Aquinas would take them to rest on what he would regard as more funda-
mental truths, namely,
(19) x is contingent —> EyyBx
and
(20) -x is contingent —> -EyyCx.
Contingent things are those that need not exist; they teeter on the brink of
nonexistence.33 Aquinas, along with other philosophers, earlier and later,
thought it obvious that anything so situated needs something to prevent its
fall.34 Thus (19) and, given that something ^contingent, (13). As for (20),
31. See Quaestiones in lib. I Physicorum, cxxxvi; translated by P. Boehner, in
Ockham, Philosophical Writings (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964), pp. 136-39. Des-
cartes follows Aquinas closely, in both terminology and examples, saying that "an
architect is the cause of a house and a father of his child only in the sense of being
the causes of their coming into being; and hence, once the work is completed it can
remain in existence quite apart from the 'cause' in this sense. But the sun is the
cause of the light which it emits, and God is the cause of created things, not just in
the sense that they are causes of the coming into being of these things, but also in
the sense that they are causes of their being." Reply to the Fifth Set of Objections, as
translated in John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, The Philo-
sophical Wήtings of Descartes, vol. II, pp. 254-55 (hereafter referred to as CSM).
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
32. It may be noted that Descartes does not hesitate to count conservation as
a species of efficient causation. See CSM, pp. 78-79.
33. Geach says that "this understanding of . . . 'contingent' is quite alien to
[Aquinas's] thought; for him contingent beings are liable to corrupt, break up, or
the like, and necessary beings are beings with no such inner seeds of their own
destruction; souls and angels belong to the latter class, and so, he thought, do the
heavenly bodies, which, being supposedly incorruptible, are expressly called entia
ex necessitate." God and the Soul, p. 77. Geach is right about Aquinas's use of 'contin-
gent,' but the notion of contingency alluded to in the text is by no means "alien to
Aquinas's thought."
34. Avicenna wrote, "Perhaps someone is of the opinion that the agent and the
cause are only required in order that something has existence after it did not exist
and that, once the thing exists and the cause is missing, the thing exists as self-suf-
ficient. And he who is of this opinion thinks that something only needs a cause for
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well, I suppose we can agree that what could not fail to exist needs neither
a producer nor a conserver.
But what about (11)? We saw some time back that in a per se ordered
descending C-sequence, the causal action of any term in the sequence is
simultaneous with that of any other term in the sequence and that there
must therefore be some one time at which all the terms of the sequence
exist. Aquinas would think this is enough to show that per se ordered
infinitely descending C-sequences are not possible, for he thought it impos-
sible for there to be an infinite multitude of actually existing things.85 But I
doubt that it was his only reason, or even his most fundamental. Avicenna
and Algazali had argued against the possibility of a per se ordered infinitely
descending C-sequence on the ground that in such a sequence the ultimate
effect would depend on an actual infinity of causes and hence could never
obtain. It is infinite dependency that in their view makes for the impossibility.
I think Aquinas agrees. In Summa contra gentiles (II, 38), in response to a
purported proof of the noneternity of the world, he says that
according to the philosophers, it is impossible to proceed to infinity in
the order of efficient causes which act together at the same time,
because in that case the effect would have to depend on an infinite
number of actions simultaneously existing. And such causes are essen-
tially infinite, because an infinity of them is required for the effect.36
I think Aquinas speaks here for himself, not only for "the philosophers."
And so I take him to be saying that infinite dependency, as would be
exemplified in an infinitely descending per se ordered C-sequence, is im-
possible. But why? Sometimes I see it, or think I do; but then again I don't.
its coming into being and that, once it has come into being and exists, it can do
without the cause. According to this opinion, causes are causes for coming into
being only, and they exist prior to the thing, not simultaneously with it. But he who
holds this opinion thinks something absurd." Metaphysics, 6th treatise, as translated
in Arthur Hyman and James J. Walsh, Philosophy in the Middle Ages (Indianapolis:
Hackett, 1973), p. 249. And in response to Gassendi, Descartes wrote, "You say that
we have a power which is sufficient to ensure that we shall continue to exist unless
some destructive cause intervenes. But here you do not realize that you are attrib-
uting to a created thing the perfection of a creator, if the created thing is able to
continue in existence independently of anything else." CSM, p. 255.
35. See ST I, 7, 4.
36. "Causas agentes in infmitum procedere est impossibile, secundum phi-
losophos, in causis simul agentibus: quia oporteret effectum dependere ex ac-
tionibus infinitis simul existentibus. Et huiusmodi sunt causae per se infinitae: quia
earum infmitas ad causatum requiritur."
